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fessors in China, and another for firms. From the surveys, we
determined that horizontal UIL is now replacing the traditional
mode of knowledge industrialization in China. We also discovered
that the current horizontal UIL in China is heavily dependent on
“formal contracts.” According to our preliminary econometric analy-
ses, the characteristic Chinese preference towards formal contract-
based UIL could be explained by the lack of “institutional thickness”
in China. This implies that China should utilize more varied chan-
nels of horizontal UIL, including informal and open science chan-
nels, as the institution becomes more sophisticated. Currently,
most Chinese firms appear to be very positive in evaluating their
own experiences of collaboration with universities. However, we have
also confirmed that promoting direct and formal UIL is not without
social costs (e.g., damaging university education), which policy
makers should carefully consider.
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I. Introduction
Many researchers have been interested in the usefulness of know-
ledge created in and disseminated from universities for the innovation
of firms. Literature on the “National Innovation System (NIS)” has
emphasized the importance of interactions or linkages between industrial
firms and various institutions, including universities (Freeman 1987;
Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993). Consequently, researchers agree on the
potentially positive impact of academic research on the development of
industrial innovation (Mansfield 1991, 1998; Salter and Martin 2001).1
However, little consensus has been achieved regarding the ideal
function of universities in supporting industrial innovation, as well as
the most effective channel of university-industry linkage (UIL) (Bekkers
and Bodas Freitas 2008; Giuliani and Arza 2009). Some authors have
focused on the effectiveness of direct and formal collaboration between
university and industry (Etzkowitz et al. 1998; Swann 2002; Monjon
and Waelbroeck 2003), while others have emphasized the fundamental
importance of indirect and informal collaboration between the two
(Branscomb et al. 1999; Cohen et al. 2002; Lundvall 2004).
An increasing, albeit small, number of studies addressing UIL has
paid attention to the distinctive situation in developing countries. Eun
et al. (2006) have proposed a new theoretical framework under which
the university-industry relationship in developing countries could be
discussed more accurately. Particularly in the case of China, some
authors have managed to deepen the understanding of the characteristic
Chinese UIL, which has been affected by both the legacy of the planned
era and Chinese-style socialism (Kroll and Liefner 2008; Eun 2009;
Eun and Lee Forthcoming).2 They seem to agree that Chinese UIL is
now largely in the process of transition from a vertical hierarchy-based
system to a horizontal network-based system.
However, studies on horizontal UIL in China show that it is still in
its infancy. Against this backdrop, this study aims to explore China’s
horizontal UIL and gather empirical evidence on its underlying charac-
teristics. To accomplish these aims, we conducted two separate surveys,
1 Mansfield (1991, 1998) argued that around 10% of new products and
processes introduced by firms would not have been developed (or only with
great delay).
2 For background knowledge about the gradual process of the economic
transition in China, refer to Lin and Tsai (2004).
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one for Chinese university professors and another for Chinese firms.
Using the survey results, we attempted to determine the driving forces
for the transition of Chinese vertical UIL to horizontal, and also to
discover the distinct features of the current Chinese horizontal UIL. In
addition, a preliminary econometric analysis was conducted to explain
Chinese characteristics. We also examined how the Chinese horizontal
UIL actually works and where it is headed. Obstacles and limitations
perceived by university professors and firms in China have been
underlined in order to draw policy implications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
process of data collection and brief sample characteristics. Section 3
analyzes how the once-prevalent university-run enterprise (URE) model,
which can be characterized by the vertical U-I relationship, recently
gave way to more horizontal channels of UIL in China. Section 4
analyzes the distinct features of the current Chinese horizontal UIL
compared with the case of the United States. In addition, three logistic
regression models estimate the underlying causes of the Chinese char-
acteristics. Section 5 discusses the prospects of the Chinese horizontal
UIL by examining the actual pattern of how Chinese firms exploit
various channels of UIL and the problems in U-I collaboration perceived
by university professors and firms in China. Section 6 summarizes the
discussion and concludes the paper.
II. Data Collection and Sample Characteristics
This study made use of data collected via two surveys conducted in
China on December of 2007 and January of 2008. One was directed at
technology managers in industrial firms (firm survey) while the other
was directed at university professors (professor survey). In the firm
survey, we followed the basic design of the Carnegie Mellon Survey,
with some adaptations reflecting the Chinese context. The professor
survey was prepared to examine the issues from the point of view of
professors.
Our sample for the firm survey was obtained from three source
groups: (1) the list of Chinese large manufacturing firms from the 2006
Yearbook of the Chinese Large Manufacturing Firms,3 (2) the list of
3
Large manufacturing firms are defined as (both indigenous and foreign-
invested) manufacturing firms with above 2,000 employees, above RMB 300
million sales revenues, and above RMB 400 million total assets in China.
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member firms registered in the Chinese Private Science and Technology
(S&T) Entrepreneurs’ Network (Zhongguo Minying Keji Wang) (www.mykj.
gov.cn/group.aspx), and (3) the list of member firms registered in
China Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) Online (www.sme.
gov.cn).4 The second and third groups were added to the first group to
lessen the expected bias in the first group toward state-owned, large-
scale enterprises.
In the phone survey, firms that did not disclose their correct phone
numbers were excluded from the sample. The final sample consisted of
2,484 firms. Our survey team contacted the technology manager or the
equivalent in each sample firm by phone to fill out the questionnaires.
We completed 302 questionnaires (102 from the first group, 73 from
4
The membership for China SME Online is available only for the small and
medium-sized firms that fall short of the requirements for large enterprises.
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the second group, and 127 from the third group), yielding a response
rate of 12.2%. Table 1 shows the basic sample characteristics in terms
of geographical location, ownership type, and scale.
The professor survey was conducted as follows. We shortlisted
Chinese universities with a University Science Park (Daxue Kejiyuan)
authorized by the central government from three different major regions
(i.e., Beijing and Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou).5 We identified 24
universities and contacted 1,238 professors in four research fields: (1)
Information Technology (IT; including electronics, telecoms, and com-
puters), (2) Biomedical Technology (BT), (3) Chemical Engineering, and
(4) Mechanical Engineering (including machine, automotives, and ship-
building). As in the firm survey, our survey team contacted professors
by phone and completed 203 questionnaires, yielding a response rate
of 16.4%. The basic sample characteristics in terms of geographical
location and academic field are shown in Table 2.
III. From Vertical to Horizontal UIL
Based on our results, we determined that the overall UIL in China
has been strengthened in recent years. When asked to report any
change between 2004 and 2007, 127 out of the 203 professors (62.6%)
said that the UIL in their universities has been strengthened. Only five
professors stated that it has weakened during the same period.
However, we also discovered that not all the possible channels of the
links have been strengthened. The so-called UREs (Xianban qiye),
5
We assumed that Chinese universities with University Science Parks
authorized by the central government have both strong research capability and
willingness to participate in industrializing scientific knowledge. In this vein, we
confined our survey to these universities.
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which prevailed in the 1990s (Eun et al. 2006; Eun 2009) seems to
have lost its importance in recent years. Data in Table 3 show that the
characteristic Chinese traditional mode of UIL is no longer welcome.
The score for UREs at the bottom of the ranking list in Table 3 is
based on the professors’ evaluation of each channel of UIL. This
indicates that the extremely hierarchical mode of UIL has been weakened,
and horizontal or network-based modes (e.g., collaborative research,
information exchange, and patent licensing) have begun to replace it.
The survey results also hint on why the UREs have declined. In
theory, as Eun et al. (2006) pointed out, there are three possible
reasons for the decline of UREs. These include (1) the development of
intermediary institutions (e.g., organizations such as technology li-
censing office (TLO) and related regulatory framework) that would at
least partially replace UREs as a channel of industrializing science and
technology (S&T) knowledge in universities, (2) the relative deterioration
of the internal resources of universities, and (3) industrial firms’
enhanced absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). The last
reason enables firms to exploit S&T knowledge produced by universities,
even though they do not have exclusive relationships with universities.
Table 4 shows that the respondent professors emphasized the enhance-
ment of firms’ absorptive capacity more than the other two possible
causes. Although this finding falls short of a rigorous test to identify
determinants of the UREs’ decline, it might allow us to tentatively
regard the enhanced absorptive capacity of ordinary Chinese firms as
the main cause of the change.
In the next section, we discuss how we determined the major chan-
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Note: University’s internal resource was evaluated in absolute terms in this
survey, although Eun et al. (2006) discussed it in relative terms.
nels that link universities to industrial firms in China. Our professor
survey results enabled us to examine in greater detail the degree of
utilization or usefulness (at least from the firms’ perspective) of in-
dividual channels of UIL in China. In theory, firms can com- municate
with, and absorb S&T knowledge from academic institutions through
various channels, which include joint research, technology licensing,
personnel exchange (including graduates), consultations, public con-
ferences and meetings, informal information exchange, and so on.
Often, however, these channels are not equally utilized; some channels
may be actively utilized while others are neglected. Moreover, the degree
of utilization differs from country to country because it may depend on
specific conditions (e.g., transaction costs, regulations, and culture) in
the country being studied. Therefore, we may deepen our understand-
ing of the Chinese characteristics by examining the major channels of
UIL in China.
IV. Characteristics of the Chinese UIL: Favoritism toward
Formal Contract-based Channels
In the previous section, we saw that Chinese professors do not
attach a huge importance on the once-prevalent vertical channel of
UIL, the UREs. This indicated that the Chinese UIL has become more
horizontal. We also determined that the reconfiguration of the Chinese
U-I relationship was partly due to the enhanced absorptive capacity of
Chinese industrial firms. Thus, in this section, the newly emerging
horizontal UIL in China is further explored, more specifically, the
horizontal channels of the UIL which are preferred by Chinese firms
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TABLE 5
CHINESE FIRMS’ EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUAL CHANNELS OF UIL
Rank
UIL channel that contributes to







1 Joint or cooperative research and
development (R&D) projects
193 63.9
2 Licensed technology 178 58.9
3 Patents 174 57.6
4 Contracting research 159 52.6
4 Consulting with individual researchers 159 52.6
4 Recently hired graduates with
above-Master’s degree
159 52.6
7 Science and/or technology parks 141 46.7
8 Publication and reports 130 43.0
9 Temporary personnel exchanges 120 39.7
10 Informal information exchange 118 39.1
11 Public conferences and meetings 110 36.4
12 Incubators 109 36.1
13 Participation in networks that involve
universities
96 31.8
and which have an increasing influence in forging the UIL. The reasons
why Chinese firms prefer specific channels of UIL are also examined in
this section.
Table 5 presents the individual channels of UIL in order of the
frequency of the respondent firms that evaluated the channel as at
least “moderately important” for the firms’ innovation. It also shows
that Chinese firms highly regard “joint or cooperative research and
development (R&D) projects,” “licensed technology,” and “patents” as
important.
We can categorize individual channels of UIL in various ways: formal
versus informal, contract-based versus non-contract-based, public (open
science) versus private (proprietary), direct versus indirect, and so on.
Among these categories, we can see that the average Chinese firms
prefer formal, contract-based, private (proprietary), and direct channels
(hereafter referred to as “formal contract-based channels”).
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TABLE 6
MOST FREQUENTLY USED UIL CHANNEL IN CHINESE UNIVERSITIES
(PROFESSOR SURVEY)
Channels of UIL %
1




Non-periodic consultation, on-site supervision, lecture, and other
activities for industry
14.7
3 Student internships to industries 13.1
4








Cooperative research with a company researcher leading to the
publication of articles or registration of intellectual property, all
without a formal contract with the company
5.8
7 On-campus training for industry personnel 4.8
8
Consultation, supervision, and other activities for companies as
official consultants
4.2
9 Your own participation in industries as the director or staff 1.0
10 Creating own start-up company 1.0
Despite having a slightly different survey design, our professor survey
results also verified the Chinese-characteristic preference found in the
firm survey. In the professor survey, the “collaborative or trusted
research under formal contracts with industries” was most preferred by
the Chinese universities as a channel of UIL (see Table 6).
These findings were surprising because they were contrary to those
obtained by Cohen et al. (2002) in their U.S. case study, in which
“public (or open science),” “personal,” and “informal” channels (e.g.,
publication, conferences, graduates, and so on) were reported to be
more highly appreciated than the formal and contract-based channels,
although the shares of positive answers are generally low in the U.S.
case. The channels most highly evaluated by Chinese firms placed at
the bottom of the U.S. list (see Table 7). Likewise, the top three
channels in the U.S. list (i.e., publications/reports, informal interacting,
meeting/conference) placed the lowest on the Chinese list (see Table 6).
What then makes Chinese firms prefer formal contract-based channels
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TABLE 7
U.S. FIRMS’ EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUAL CHANNELS OF UIL































Note: % share of respondents rating the individual channel as at least
moderately important.
Source: Excerpt form Cohen et al. (2002, p. 15) Table 6.
in their interaction with academic institutions? From the widely
acknowledged differences between China and the U.S. (in terms of
developmental stage of the firm, level of technological sophistication of
the firm, and level of institutional sophistication of the society), we can
formulate several hypotheses explaining the Chinese inclination toward
formal contract-based channels.
First, we should pay attention to the developmental stage (or size, for
operational convenience) of the firm. Generally, Chinese firms lag
behind their U.S. counterparts in terms of the developmental stage.
The sample firms included in the U.S. and Chinese surveys are
significantly different in size. In the U.S. case, the median firm has
2,263 employees, and the average firm has 20,263 employees (Cohen et
al. 2002, p. 4). In the Chinese case, however, median and average
firms have only 600 and 2,834 employees, respectively. This difference
may explain the Chinese firms’ inclination toward formal contract-
based channels. In the same way, we can hypothesize that firms at the
earlier stage of development (operating as smaller firms in terms of
number of employees) would prefer formal contract-based channels
(H1-1).
On the other hand, one can also assume that formal contract-based
channels may be more suitable for larger companies with stronger
internal capability. From this, we can generate an opposite (in terms of
size) hypothesis (H1-2). Hence we have two hypotheses in terms of the
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developmental stage (size) of a firm.
H1: Developmental stage (or size) of the firm (individual firm factor)
H1-1: Firms at the earlier stage of development (or smaller firms)
prefer formal contract-based channels in interacting with
universities.
H1-2: Larger firms prefer formal contract-based channels in inter-
acting with universities.
Chinese firms’ lower level of technological sophistication (compared
to U.S. firms) may also explain their inclination toward formal contract-
based channels. Hypothetically speaking, firms with weak technological
capability may want to guarantee the completion of knowledge transfer
from universities through formal contracts because these firms have
only limited absorptive capacity and encounter difficulties in fully ex-
ploiting abstruse academic knowledge without the active involvement of
universities. However, as in the case of H1, the opposite argument is
also plausible because firms with stronger technological capabilities
may be more interested in new knowledge developed in/by universities
and become more aggressive in acquiring the knowledge through
formal contracts. Therefore, we have two hypotheses in terms of a
firms’ level of technological sophistication.
H2: Technological sophistication of the firm (individual firm factor)
H2-1: Firms with a lower level of technological sophistication prefer
formal contract-based channels in interacting with univer-
sities.
H2-2: Firms with a higher level of technological sophistication prefer
formal contract-based channels in interacting with univer-
sities.
H1 and H2 focus on individual firms’ internal characteristics in
explaining Chinese firms’ inclination toward formal contract-based
channels. However, one can also conclude that external or environmental
factors may influence individual firms’ preference for specific channels
of UIL. Literature on “institutional thickness” indicate that the average
economic performance and the dominant behavioral pattern of individual
firms in a region are affected by the region’s institutional thickness
(see e.g., Evans and Harding (1997)). Institutional thickness is defined
as the totality of social, cultural, and institutional forms and supports
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available to enterprises.6 In this context, one can reasonably infer that
firms in institutionally underdeveloped regions where opportunistic
behaviors are more probable and enforcement mechanisms are limited
would more strongly insist on formal contracts in interacting with
universities for knowledge transfer. Therefore, we hypothesize that the
institutional imperfection in China would drive Chinese firms to resort
to formal contract-based UIL channels (H3-1). China can be considered
as lagging behind in terms of “institutional thickness,” at least com-
pared with the U.S.
On the other hand, one may also argue that formal contracts can be
effectively enforced only when the institutional environment is suf-
ficiently sophisticated, indicating that firms located in regions with a
higher level of institutional sophistication (or thickness) would prefer
formal contract-based channels in interacting with universities. Thus,
we have another set of competing hypotheses.
H3: Institutional thickness of the region (environmental or social
factor)
H3-1: Firms located in regions with a lower level of institutional
sophistication (or thickness) would prefer formal contract-
based channels in interacting with universities.
H3-2: Firms located in regions with a higher level of institutional
sophistication (or thickness) would prefer formal contract-
based channels in interacting with universities.
To test the hypotheses introduced above, three binary logistic regres-
sion models (one model for each of the three most preferred formal
contract-based channels in China) were calculated. In each model, the
dependent variable is the respondent firms’ evaluation of the channel
in terms of its contribution to the firms’ innovation, and is binary in
nature (at least moderately important (1) or otherwise (0)). The in-
dependent variables are listed in Table 8.7
In these regression models, we limited our data to information
6
According to Amin and Thrift (1995), institutional thickness refers to the webs
of supporting organizations such as financial institutions, chambers of commerce,
trade associations, training organization, local authorities, and marketing and
business support agencies. Often, invisible institutions such as unwritten laws,
shared views, and beliefs are also considered important ingredients of the
institution.
7
No statistically significant correlation was found among the independent variables.
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TABLE 8








stage of the firm (H1)
Log number of employees C
RDP_ratio
Technological
sophistication of the firm
(H2)






the region where the
firm is located (H3)
Location (Eastern provinces
(1) versus Mid or Western
provinces (0))
D





Chemical_dum control Petrochemical industry D
Note: C, continuous; D, dummy.
　　
TABLE 9













Ln(Size)　 0.254* 1.290 0.066 0.316** 1.371 0.021 -0.001 0.999 0.997
RDP_ratio　 0.668 1.950 0.463 0.736 2.088 0.410 0.279 1.322 0.750




IT 0.023 1.023 0.950 0.417 1.517 0.269 -0.157 0.854 0.664
BT 1.294** 3.646 0.012 0.025 1.025 0.950 0.114 1.121 0.772
Che-
mical
0.028 1.029 0.950 -0.214 0.807 0.630 -0.039 0.961 0.930
Goodness-of-fit test
(Hosmer & Lemeshow test)
0.980 0.308 0.974
Notes: 1) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
2) If the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test statistic is greater
than 0.1 (as desired for well-fitting models), we do not reject the
null hypothesis that there is no difference between observed and
model-predicted values, implying that the model’s estimates fit the
data at an acceptable level.
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acquired from China. It is ideal to merge the Chinese and U.S. data in
analyzing China-U.S. differences; however, we were unable to do so
because the original U.S. data (gathered by Cohen and his colleagues)
were not available at the time of our analysis (although the U.S. data
are believed to be comparable with the Chinese data). Thus, direct
comparison between the two countries is left for future study and the
regression analyses in this study should be regarded as a preliminary
exploration of the underlying causes behind Chinese characteristics.
The regression results in Table 9 show that larger firms would more
highly appreciate “joint or cooperative R&D” and “licensed technology”
in China. Although firm size does not matter in the case of “patents,”
we can argue that larger firms would prefer formal contract-based
channels of UIL in China. This also means that Chinese firms’ inclina-
tion toward formal contract-based channels does not stem from its
smaller size (or lower developmental stage).
On the other hand, the level of technological sophistication of in-
dustrial firms proved to be irrelevant to their preference for formal
contract-based channels. Although all the coefficients of “RDP_ratio” in
the three models have consistently positive values, suggesting that firms
at a higher level of technological sophistication would prefer formal
contract-based channels, none of the coefficients were statistically signi-
ficant. Therefore, it is safe to say that the pronounced preference of
Chinese firms for formal contract-based channels is not caused by
their lower level of technological sophistication either. Individual firm
factors cannot successfully explain the difference of preferences between
Chinese and American firms in selecting channels of linkage with
universities (see Table 10).
Regarding the environmental (or external) factor (H3), Model 3 shows
that the firms located in Eastern provinces, assumed to be institutionally
thicker regions, resort less to “patents” (see Table 9). Additionally, in
Models 1 and 2, the coefficients of “Eastern_dum” have consistently
negative values, although these are not statistically significant. From
these results, we can tentatively deduce that the distinct inclination of
Chinese firms toward formal contract-based channels is due to the lack
of institutional thickness in the region where they are located.
Moreover, this can be further supported by the findings of Eun, Wu,
and Wang (2009) in their interviews with senior engineers from some
Chinese firms conducted on April and May 2008:




















































Note: Accepting the hypothesis with statistically significant evidence, ○;
otherwise, X.
A senior engineer in Antai S&T (a technology intermediary agent) pointed
out the “lack of trust” as a main reason of Chinese firms’ preference of
formal contract-based UIL channels. Another senior engineer in Beijing
automotive group said that China’s incomplete legal system and limited
experience of U-I collaboration drive both firms and academic institutions to
stick to formal contracts in order to protect their own interests and to
prevent opportunistic behaviors of their partners (Eun, Wu, and Wang 2009,
p. 50)
V. Prospects and Limitations of Burgeoning UIL in China
In the previous sections, it was established that horizontal UIL is
currently rising in China. However, we also found that China’s current
horizontal UIL was mainly forged with the help of “formal contracts.”
Moreover, our regression analyses indicated that the Chinese partiality
toward formal contracts could most likely reflect the lack of “institu-
tional thickness” in China. This fact implies that China may utilize
diverse channels of UIL as the related institution becomes thicker in
the future.
Through trial and error, Chinese universities and firms are currently
accumulating experiences in communicating and interacting with each
other. If these experiences were positively assimilated, they would help
build “trust” between universities and firms, leading to more flexible
and non-contract-backed horizontal UIL.
According to our survey findings, most Chinese firms appear to be
very positive in evaluating their own experiences of collaboration with
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TABLE 11
Factor Analysis of China’s UIL Channels
Individual channel
Factor loading
Factor 1 Factor 2
Incubators
Contracting research
Joint or cooperative R&D projects
Science and/or technology parks
Temporary personnel exchanges
Participation in networks that involve universities
Recently hired graduates with above-Master’s degree



































Note: The threshold for factor loading: 0.600.
universities. The survey results showed that the majority of firms
(93.5%) have already reached their pre-set goals in their partnership
with universities or expect to do so in the near future. Less than 7% of
the firms stated that the collaboration with universities has already
failed or would eventually fail. This seems to indicate that China’s
horizontal UIL would prosper in the future.
Chinese firms appear to be already utilizing other types of UIL
channels as a supplement to formal contract-based channels. In order
to demonstrate this trend, we conducted factor analysis. Factor analysis
is a statistical method used to describe variability among observed
variables in terms of fewer unobserved variables called factors. We
applied this method to our respondent firms’ evaluations on the
usefulness of individual UIL channels in order to see how Chinese
firms combine (or mix) individual channels in forging links with
universities. In other words, through factor analysis, we can determine
how different channels relate to one another.
Table 11 shows that channels that load on the first factor include
not only formal contract-based channels (i.e., “contractual research with
universities” and “joint or cooperative R&D projects”) but also loose
network-based channels (i.e., “incubators,” “science and/or technology
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TABLE 12












Restriction on research time due to conflicting
schedule of the industry
70 43.8
2
Time restriction that results from confounding




The industry's lack of understanding of the
technology or the information involved
44 27.5
4 The university's insufficient reward system 16 10.0
5
The government's excessive regulations or
inappropriate policies or laws
15 9.4
6
The industry's prejudice against the university
researcher
13 8.1
7 Excessive regulations from the university 11 6.9
8
Unsatisfactory reward for the research results
and unreasonable distribution of profits
10 6.3
9




Negative opinions of fellow researchers or
students within the university
3 1.9
11 Problems regarding co-authorship of the article 2 1.3
parks,” “temporary personnel exchanges,” and “participation in networks
that involve universities”). On the other hand, “publication and reports,”
“public conferences and meetings,” and “informal information exchange,”
which represent the public (or open science) and informal channels of
UIL, load on the second factor. These results imply that Chinese firms
often combine the use of formal contract-based channels with efforts to
construct general networks with universities. This indicates that the
Chinese UIL’s heavy dependence on narrow formal contracts could
possibly be diluted by the use of more evolved “network-based” channels
in the future.
As discussed, it is probable that China’s horizontal UIL would
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further prevail in the future while its dependence on “formal contracts”
would gradually decrease. However, the progress of horizontal UIL is
not without difficulties. Chinese professors emphasized several problems
and side effects concerning the burgeoning UIL in China. Table 12
illustrates the difficulties perceived by Chinese professors in collabora-
ting with firms.
According to Table 12, the most frequently reported problem is time
restriction. This indicates that professors typically have difficulty in
meeting the hasty (at least from the standpoint of professors) require-
ments of industrial partners who are most likely also pressed for time.
This may be due to the cultural difference between liberal universities
and the tightly disciplined firms. It can also be attributed to the fact
that professors, who are mostly tied up with teaching and academic
research, have only limited time to devote themselves to collaboration
with industrial firms. This results in a “trade-off” between education
and research on one hand, and collaboration with industrial firms on
the other.8
For that reason, it should be taken into account that universities
may suffer from “opportunity costs” when they excessively allocate
resources (including professors’ time and commitment) while making
direct linkages with industrial firms. Technically, universities can con-
tribute to firms indirectly, for instance, by providing well-educated
graduates for the society. However, we discovered, through this study,
that there exists a trade-off between different university functions in
China. Furthermore, our survey findings showed that even firms do not
always place top priority on “industrializing S&T knowledge” as an
important function of universities; rather, the respondent firms in our
survey attached more importance to “education and training” (see Table
13). This implies that maximizing the strength of the UIL at the
expense of traditional but core functions of universities (i.e., education
and training) may not be the right policy to implement.
In addition, Chinese professors also complained about industrial
partners’ lack of understanding regarding technology, insufficient reward
systems, and excessive regulations from universities and governments
(see Table 12). This implies that a higher technological capacity (or
8
This is in line with the ongoing global debate on whether we should further
promote direct and formal UIL, considering the concerns about the costs and
time consumed by U-I networking that may be detrimental to education and
long-term academic research (Poyago-Theotoky et al. 2002; Giuliani and Arza
2009).














CHINESE FIRMS’ PERCEPTION OF IMPORTANT ROLE OF UNIVERSITIES
absorptive capacity) on the part of industrial partners and better bal-
anced policy measures are the pre-requisites for the full exploitation of
the UIL.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
Until recently, Chinese universities established their own business
firms (i.e., UREs) and commercialized new technological knowledge
through firms under their control. The previous university-industry
relationship was based on an administrative hierarchy or vertical linkage.
However, things have changed, and the growing absorptive capacity of
ordinary Chinese firms has resulted in the growth of horizontal UIL in
China.
This study aimed to explore the emerging horizontal UIL in China.
Towards this purpose, we conducted two separate but closely related
surveys using questionnaires (one for universities and another for
industrial firms) in China. Using the survey results, we verified that
the vertical channel of knowledge industrialization (e.g., UREs) is being
replaced by a more horizontal UIL, mainly due to the enhanced absorp-
tive capacity of Chinese firms. In addition, we found that the current
Chinese horizontal UIL could be characterized by its heavy dependence
on formal contracts. This finding is interesting because it is the opposite
of the result obtained by Cohen and his colleagues in a similar study
in the U.S., where informal and open science channels were highly
appreciated by firms.
To determine the underlying causes of the inclination of Chinese
firms toward formal contract-based UIL, we estimated three logistic
regression models. From the regression analyses, we determined that
larger firms prefer formal contract-based channels in China. However,
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China’s heavier dependence on formal contracts than the U.S. could
only be explained by the difference in institutional thickness of the
regions where firms are located, rather than individual firms’ internal
characteristics. Nevertheless, this conclusion should be regarded as
tentative because it was only derived from the comparison between the
relatively rich and industrialized (thus assumed to be institutionally
thicker) Eastern China and the rest of China. Therefore, a more
rigorous econometric analysis of the China-U.S. difference is left for
future studies.
If institutional thickness is significant in a firm’s choice of UIL
channels, as our preliminary analysis indicates, China would utilize
more channels of UIL, including informal and open science channels in
the future, as the institutional environment becomes more sophisticated.
According to our survey findings, Chinese firms are trying to combine
formal contract-based channels with efforts to establish more general
networks with universities.
These findings imply that China is on the path towards establishing
full-fledged horizontal UIL with less dependence on formal contracts,
although it will take time for China to reach that objective. However,
we also discovered that the strengthening of horizontal UIL in China
could be challenged by side effects. Our survey findings show that
Chinese professors have experienced uncomfortable trade-offs between
education and research on one hand, and collaboration with industrial
firms on the other. A policy suggestion that we can draw from this
finding is that policy makers (in universities and governments) should
pay closer attention to the less visible means by which universities
contribute to industry and society, that is, by providing well-educated
graduates. Ignorance of these contributions, and the excessive emphasis
on apparent and direct UIL, may be disadvantageous not only to
education and long-term academic research, but also to social welfare.
(Received 27 February 2009; Revised 24 October 2009)
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